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Bioethical Aspects of Patients  
in a Minimally Conscious State 
Fabio Alberto Garzón Díaz*
The arrival of powerful neuroimaging tools such 
as functional magnetic resonance imaging (fmri) 
or positron emission tomography (pet) has be-
gun to redefine the traditional way in which we 
have dealt with disorders of consciousness, es-
pecially the vegetative state (vs) and minimally 
conscious states (mcs). However, this same tech-
nological advance has sparked the controversy 
about how these patients should be treated, who 
are generally almost abandoned waiting for an 
uncertain “end” and sometimes condemned not 
to receive any medical treatment. This editorial 
raises the ethical challenges posed by the new 
diagnostic and therapeutic neuroimaging appli-




An emblematic case of mcs is that of a young man 
named Terry Wallis, who recovered (2003) from 
a—so considered until then—permanent vege-
tative state in which he had been since the mid-
1980s, as a result of a severe car accident near 
Stone County, Arkansas, on July 13, 1984. Terry 
began to speak spontaneously. His first words were 
“mom” and “Pepsi.” As the weeks went by, howev-
er, he grew more fluid. Interestingly, Terry Wallis 
was anchored in time; for him, Ronald Reagan 
was still the president of the United States (1).
Although recent studies show that 40 % of pa-
tients are erroneously diagnosed as vs patients in 
assisted residences, when in fact they are in a mcs, 
(2,3,4) the truth is that not a single neurologist saw 
Terry Wallis in 19 years. According to his father, 
the doctors said it was not necessary as nothing 
was going to change. The patient developed mus-
cle contractures over the years since he did not 
receive physiotherapy either. Today, Wallis’s brain 
continues to recover, but sadly his atrophied body 
is not keeping up with his brain recovery (1). 
Contributions from the group  
of Dr. Fins and collaborators  
(6-7,9-10) 
Dr. Joseph Fins’ research, published in the most 
prestigious journals specialized in neurology 
and bioethics such as Neurology, (5-8,11) the 
Hastings Center Report, (4,12-13) or the Amer-
ican Journal of Bioethics, (14-16) is the best ex-
pression of the need to carry out a critical and 
ethical analysis on the treatment that clinicians 
have been providing to mcs patients.
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Fins argues that recent studies have shown 
that the error rate of patients diagnosed with vs 
but who are actually mcs patients is up to 40 % 
(17). An error rate like this would be inconceiv-
able in any other field of medicine (18). The rea-
sons for this misdiagnosis are multifactorial (17). 
The behaviors that patients manifest in states of 
unconsciousness are episodic, intermittent, and, 
in many cases, not captured in a single exam. 
If the family sees some behavior and only 
informs the nursing staff, it is likely that this will 
not be subject to observation, especially when the 
patient is in the medical center where he/she was 
definitively diagnosed with vs.
Fins’ works attempt to demonstrate through 
neuroimaging that the vs can turn into an mcs 
before becoming permanent. The mcs per se is 
never questioned. Fins attempts to contextualize 
these patients within the range of conditions that 
constitute disorders of consciousness and refine 
it against the most recent category mcs. As I have 
pointed out in several articles, (8,14,17) the mcs 
is easily confused with the vs, although there are 
profound biological differences between these 
two stages. The difference is fundamental; bio-
logically, the brains of patients in an mcs have 
the capacity for the integrative function, which 
is the basis of consciousness, unlike patients in a 
vs who have already lost it.
Fins also describes two crucial works that 
determine the level of communication in mcs 
patients . The first work shows, using fmri, that 
when receiving a painful stimulus, patients in a 
vs exhibit limited brain activity in the primary 
sensory area, that is, in the first station on the 
way to the brain network, but without activity in 
the brain network as a whole (19). 
On the other hand, Dr. Nicholas Schiff’s 
works, using the same neuroimaging techniques, 
reveal that when patients in an mcs hear their fam-
ily members reading short stories to them, all the 
neural networks of language activate. Schiff con-
cludes that minimally conscious patients are not 
simply receiving the auditory stimulus, but that the 
entire neural network of language processes it (20). 
Strikingly, the research team discovered that 
when the recording of the same text is played 
backward (which makes it unintelligible), the 
same activation of the language network is not 
observed, suggesting that mcs patients respond 
to the syntax and grammar of the language in a 
way that patients in a vs cannot (21-22). 
The difference between these two types of pa-
tients is that in an mcs, we could advance in re-
establishing functional communication, while in 
the irreversible permanent vs, any type of com-
munication is impossible.
Bioethical implications 
- Challenges in the face of non-maleficence: Every 
patient has the right to an adequate clinical di-
agnosis. We are aware that it is not easy to make 
a good diagnosis in mcs patients. However, 
clinicians must make every effort and use all avail-
able means and knowledge to reduce uncertainty 
concerning the diagnosis, prognosis, and reha-
bilitation of patients with disorders of conscious-
ness. From bioethical principlism, we would 
be violating the highest principle that governs 
health workers: non-maleficence (1). 
- Do not abandon patients: When a patient 
is misdiagnosed as vegetative, it seems like the 
medical team loses interest in him/her. It is al-
most like calling him/her a “non-recoverable pa-
tient,” which means that acute treatment centers 
do not start or stop treatment or even make these 
patients organ donors before they are allowed to 
demonstrate their potential to recover (1). 
- Right to treatment: Fins published in Nature 
how the rehabilitation of patients in a mcs could be: 
bilateral deep brain stimulation in the intralaminar 
nucleus of the thalamus could produce an improve-
ment in cognitively mediated functions, such as lan-
guage and control of the limbs, and that the ability to 
feed orally was recovered in a minimally conscious pa-
tient who, before stimulation, was unable to commu-
nicate and who relied on a tube for feeding (23 p601).  
- Futile or unnecessary treatments: Futile 
comes from the Latin futilis, which means 
pointless and is a synonym of vain, useless, and 
sterile (24). Ultimately, it means that treatment 
is irrelevant to the consequences. Futility is 
twofold since, on the one hand, it implies the 
implementation of therapeutic measures that 
would be useless and their repercussions (giving 
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false hope to the family, increasing institution-
al costs, among others), and on the other, the 
dreaded prolongation of the agony, which is un-
doubtedly much more severe. Are we providing 
ineffective treatments to minimally conscious 
patients? What Fins maintains is that the dis-
tinction between the vs and the mcs is that the 
objectives must be different because the condi-
tions are different. For example, we can advance 
in the restoration of functional communication 
as a goal in an mcs, which is not achievable in 
the irreversible permanent vs, assuming the 
diagnosis is correct. Therefore, there is a prob-
ability that we give unnecessary treatments to 
patients in a vs and not to patients in a mcs, for 
whom I consider all possible means to restore 
their condition should be increased.
- Quality vs. quantity: Could we affirm that 
patients in an mcs state have a poor quality of 
life? How do we measure it? Who or who deter-
mines it? Is the quality of life of a patient in a mcs 
so poor that dying is preferable to continuing to 
live? The problem with the concept of quality of 
life is that it is tough to define since it is not an 
intellectual or objective concept. Instead, it is 
an aspiration or ideal that can only be realized 
in a specific historical, social, and personal con-
text. It is necessary to develop a concept of qual-
ity of life that does not relativize the value of 
people based on merit, rank, or social utility (25). 
- Communication: One way to abandon a pa-
tient is by limiting communication with him/her 
or with his/her close relatives or representatives. 
For Dr. Ara, communication between the doc-
tor and the patient or whoever is representing 
him/her must be truthful, understandable, pro-
gressive, and sensitive, providing the necessary 
information so that the latter can decide. When 
communicating, the doctor should try to avoid 
prejudices about the treatment and the quality of 
life in these situations of disability (26-27). 
- Returning to Terry: The fundamental 
difference between patients like Terry Schiavo 
(as well as Karen Quindlan) and Terry Wallis is 
that Schiavo suffered anoxic brain damage in 1990, 
while Terry Wallis suffered traumatic brain dam-
age in 1984. Several studies confirm that damage 
from anoxia has a much worse prognosis than 
traumatic brain damage and that those who spend 
more than three months in a vs due to anoxia will 
remain vegetative forever. Fins says that 
Terry Wallis, on the other hand, spent years without 
being evaluated by anyone. Schiavo received deep 
brain stimulation as part of a Medtronic company 
clinical trial in the early 1990s, without regaining any 
level of consciousness. Wallis, on the other hand, 
spontaneously developed signals that he connected 
with the environment. Terry Schiavo was in a vege-
tative state. The motor responses were reflexes. There 
was no change or progress in his brain state, and 
it can be said that his brain was disintegrated, that it 
did not function as an integrated whole (1 p42). 
However, the ethical treatment that was given 
to the two cases was different: both Quindlan’s 
and Schiavo’s (due to their permanent vs) repre-
sentatives resort to the courts to obtain a digni-
fied death for their loved ones arguing that “They 
would let them die with dignity and in peace.” 
Meanwhile, Fins thinks that cases like Terry 
Wallis and thousands of others that are diag-
nosed with mcs must be brought to the courts to 
ensure that all efforts are made for these patients 
to recover their life in society in the best possible 
way: 
But Wallis, unlike Schiavo, emerged in 2003 gaining 
coherent communicative functionality, and contin-
ues to improve to this day, accumulating new layers 
of memories in his memory, gaining capacity and 
recovering the sense of time. Your brain is being 
functionally reintegrated, in the sense that it can 
now reassemble neural networks. This dynamic, this 
brain plasticity constitutes the most notable differ-
ence between the vegetative state and the state of 
minimal consciousness (1 p43).  
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